فرماندهي پدافند سايبري سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامي
Revolution Guard Cyber Defense Command (RCDC)
مركز بررسي جرائم سازمان يافته ، يكي از مراكز وابسته به فرماندهي پدافند سايبري سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامي مي باشد.
وظيفه اين مركز نظارت و بررسي جرائم سازمان يافته تروريستي ، جاسوسي ، اقتصادي و اجتماعي در فضاي مجازي مي باشد كه با همكاري و هماهنگي ساير حوزه هاي اطلاعاتي و قضايي در جهت بررسي تهديدات و آسيب هاي شبكه جهاني اينترنت و ساير فناوري هاي نوين از توان فني و اطلاعاتي كارشناسان سپاه پاسدارن و ساير متخصصين بهره گرفته و طبق اصل 150 قانون اساسي در راستاي نگهباني از انقلاب و دستاوردهاي آن فعاليت مي نمايد.
رشد قارچ گونه جرائم سازمان یافته بین المللی و سوء استفاده از بستر اینترنت و سایر سامانه های ارتباطی در جهت انجام اقدامات تروریستی ، جاسوسی اینترنتی ، پولشویی ، و تخریب نظام فرهنگی و اجتماعی جامعه و هتک حرمت و توهین به مقدسات دینی و ارزشهای انقلابی از دلایل راه اندازی مرکز بررسی جرائم سازمان یافته در سال 1386 به منظور شناسایی و برخورد با جرائم مذکور با هماهنگی قوه قضائیه جمهوری اسلامی بوده است .
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بازخواني فرمايشات حضرت امام خميني (ره)
غلط ميكني قانون را قبول نداري قانون تو را قبول ندارد
گزيدهاي از فرمايشات بنيانگذار جمهوري اسلامي حضرت امام خميني (ره) درباره تمكين مسئولان ، احزاب و گروهها به قانون و فصلالخطاب بودن قانون اساسي و شوراي نگهبان به شرح ذيل است:
▪ من باز به همه اين آقاياني كه ميخواهند نطق كنند و اعلاميه بدهند و نميدانم نامه سرگشاده بفرستند و ازاين مزخرفات، به همه اينها اعلام ميكنم كه برگرديد به اسلام، برگرديد به قانون ، برگرديد به قرآن كريم ، بهانه درست نكنيد كه اسباب اين بشود كه شما همه به انزوا كشيده بشويد. من به بسياري از شما علاقه دارم و ميل دارم كه همه به قانون عمل كنند و همه در جاي خود باشند و چنانچه اينطور نباشد، مسئله طور ديگر خواهد شد. (صحيفه امام جلد 14 صفحه 415)
▪ نميشود از شما پذيرفت كه ما قانون را قبول نداريم. غلط ميكني قانون را قبول نداري!قانون تو را قبول ندارد نبايد از مردم پذيرفت، از كسي پذيرفت ، ما شوراي نگهبان را قبول نداريم. نميتواني قبول نداشته باشي. مردم راي دادن به اينها ، مردم 16 ميليون تقريبا يا يك قدري بيشتر راي دادن به قانون اساسي. مردم كه به قانون اساسي راي دادند منتظرند كه قانون اساسي اجرا بشود؛ هر کس از هرجا صبح بلند ميشود بگويد من شوراي نگهبان را قبول ندارم ، من قانون اساسي را قبول ندارم ،من مجلس را قبول ندارم ، من رئيسجمهور را قبول ندارم ، من دولت را قبول ندارم. نه ! همه بايد مقيد به اين باشيد كه قانون را بپذيريد ، ولو برخلاف راي شما باشد. بايد بپذيريد، براي اينكه ميزان اكثريت است ؛ و تشخيص شوراي نگهبان كه اين مخالف قانون نيست و مخالف اسلام هم نيست ، ميزان است كه همه بايد بپذيريم.
(صحيفه امام جلد 14 صفحه 378)
▪ اگر يك جايي عمل به قانون شد و يك گروهي در خيابانها برضد اين عمل بخواهند عرض اندام كنند، اين همان معناي ديكتاتوري است كه مكرر گفتهام قدم به قدم پيش ميرود، اين همان ديكتاتوري است كه به هيتلر مبدل ميشود انسان،اين همان ديكتاتوري است كه به استالين انسان را مبدل ميكند. اگر قانون در يك كشوري عمل نشود ، كساني كه ميخواهند قانون را بشكنند اينها ديكتاتوراني هستند كه به صورت اسلامي پيش آمدهاند يا به صورت آزادي و امثال اين حرفها. اگر همه اين آقايان كه ادعاي اين را ميكنند كه ما طرفدار قوانين هستيم ، اينها با هم بنشينند و قانون را باز كنند و تكليف را از روي قانون همه شان معين كنند و بعد هم ملتزم باشند كه اگر قانون برخلاف راي من هم بود من خاضع ام ، اگر بر وفاق هم بود من خاضعام ،ديگر دعوايي پيش نميآيد؛ هياهو پيش نميآيد.
(صحيفه امام جلد 14 صفحه 415)
▪ قانون معنايش اين است كه{ همه} چيزها {را} به حسب قانون اسلامي ، به حسب قانون كشوري كه منطبق با قوانين اسلام است ، همه را ،وظيفهاشان را قانون معين كرده. بعد از اين كه قانون وظيفه را معين كرد ، هر کس بخواهد كه برخلاف او عمل بكند، اين يك ديكتاتوري است كه حالا به صورت مظلومانه پيش آمده است و بعد به صورت قاهرانه پيش خواهد آمد و بعد اين كشور را به تباهي خواهد كشيد و اين كشور وقتي به تباهي كشيده شد و اين مردم متفرق و مختلف با هم شدند ، اين همان وظيفه اي است كه براي ابرقدرتها بايد انجام بدهد اين آدم انجام داده، ولو خودش نمي فهمد، اگر بفهمد كه ديگر مصيبت بالاتر است،لكن خودشان ملتفت نيستند.
(صحيفه امام جلد 14 صفحه 415)
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Iran's Web Spying Aided By Western Technology
European Gear Used in Vast Effort to Monitor Communications
By Christopher Rhoads in New York and Loretta Chao in Beijing
The Iranian regime has developed, with the assistance of European telecommunications companies, one of the world's most sophisticated mechanisms for controlling and censoring the Internet, allowing it to examine the content of individual online communications on a massive scale.
Interviews with technology experts in Iran and outside the country say Iranian efforts at monitoring Internet information go well beyond blocking access to Web sites or severing Internet connections.
Instead, in confronting the political turmoil that has consumed the country this past week, the Iranian government appears to be engaging in a practice often called deep packet inspection, which enables authorities to not only block communication but to monitor it to gather information about individuals, as well as alter it for disinformation purposes, according to these experts.
The monitoring capability was provided, at least in part, by a joint venture of Siemens AG, the German conglomerate, and Nokia Corp., the Finnish cellphone company, in the second half of 2008, Ben Roome, a spokesman for the joint venture, confirmed.
The "monitoring center," installed within the government's telecom monopoly, was part of a larger contract with Iran that included mobile-phone networking technology, Mr. Roome said.
"If you sell networks, you also, intrinsically, sell the capability to intercept any communication that runs over them," said Mr. Roome.
The sale of the equipment to Iran by the joint venture, called Nokia Siemens Networks, was previously reported last year by the editor of an Austrian information-technology Web site called Futurezone.
The Iranian government had experimented with the equipment for brief periods in recent months, but it had not been used extensively, and therefore its capabilities weren't fully displayed -- until during the recent unrest, the Internet experts interviewed said.
"We didn't know they could do this much," said a network engineer in Tehran. "Now we know they have powerful things that allow them to do very complex tracking on the network."
Deep packet inspection involves inserting equipment into a flow of online data, from emails and Internet phone calls to images and messages on social-networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter. Every digitized packet of online data is deconstructed, examined for keywords and reconstructed within milliseconds. In Iran's case, this is done for the entire country at a single choke point, according to networking engineers familiar with the country's system. It couldn't be determined whether the equipment from Nokia Siemens Networks is used specifically for deep packet inspection..
All eyes have been on the Internet amid the crisis in Iran, and government attempts to crack down on information. The infiltration of Iranian online traffic could explain why the government has allowed the Internet to continue to function -- and also why it has been running at such slow speeds in the days since the results of the presidential vote spurred unrest.
Users in the country report the Internet having slowed to less than a tenth of normal speeds. Deep packet inspection delays the transmission of online data unless it is offset by a huge increase in processing power, according to Internet experts.
Iran is "now drilling into what the population is trying to say," said Bradley Anstis, director of technical strategy with Marshal8e6 Inc., an Internet security company in Orange, Calif. He and other experts interviewed have examined Internet traffic flows in and out of Iran that show characteristics of content inspection, among other measures. "This looks like a step beyond what any other country is doing, including China."
China's vaunted "Great Firewall," which is widely considered the most advanced and extensive Internet censoring in the world, is believed also to involve deep packet inspection. But China appears to be developing this capability in a more decentralized manner, at the level of its Internet service providers rather than through a single hub, according to experts. That suggests its implementation might not be as uniform as that in Iran, they said, as the arrangement depends on the cooperation of all the service providers.
Checks and Balances
Iran's government is a combination of democracy and Islamic theocracy. Take a look at the power structure.
The difference, at least in part, has to do with scale: China has about 300 million Internet users, the most of any country. Iran, which has an estimated 23 million users, can track all online communication through a single location called the Telecommunication Infrastructure Co., part of the government's telecom monopoly. All of the country's international links run through the company.
Separately, officials from the U.S. embassy in Beijing on Friday met with Chinese officials to express concerns about a new requirement that all PCs sold in the China starting July 1 be installed with Web-filtering software.
If a government wants to control the flow of information across its borders it's no longer enough to block access to Web sites hosted elsewhere. Now, as sharing online images and messages through social-networking sites has become easy and popular, repressive regimes are turning to technologies that allow them to scan such content from their own citizens, message by message.
Human-rights groups have criticized the selling of such equipment to Iran and other regimes considered repressive, because it can be used to crack down on dissent, as evidenced in the Iran crisis. Asked about selling such equipment to a government like Iran's, Mr. Roome of Nokia Siemens Networks said the company "does have a choice about whether to do business in any country. We believe providing people, wherever they are, with the ability to communicate is preferable to leaving them without the choice to be heard."
Countries with repressive governments aren't the only ones interested in such technology. Britain has a list of blocked sites, and the German government is considering similar measures. In the U..S., the National Security Agency has such capability, which was employed as part of the Bush administration's "Terrorist Surveillance Program." A White House official wouldn't comment on if or how this is being used under the Obama administration.
The Australian government is experimenting with Web-site filtering to protect its youth from online pornography, an undertaking that has triggered criticism that it amounts to government-backed censorship.
Content inspection and filtering technology are already common among corporations, schools and other institutions, as part of efforts to block spam and viruses, as well as to ensure that employees and students comply with computer-use guidelines. Families use filtering on their home computers to protect their children from undesirable sites, such as pornography and gambling.
Internet censoring in Iran was developed with the initial justification of blocking online pornography, among other material considered offensive by the regime, according to those who have studied the country's censoring.
Iran has been grappling with controlling the Internet since its use moved beyond universities and government agencies in the late 1990s. At times, the government has tried to limit the country's vibrant blogosphere -- for instance, requiring bloggers to obtain licenses from the government, a directive that has proved difficult to enforce, according to the OpenNet Initiative, a partnership of universities that study Internet filtering and surveillance. (The partners are Harvard University, the University of Toronto, the University of Cambridge and the University of Oxford.)
Beginning in 2001, the government required Internet service providers to install filtering systems, and also that all international connections link to a single gateway controlled by the country's telecom monopoly, according to an OpenNet study.
Iran has since blocked Internet users in the country from more than five million sites in recent years, according to estimates from the press-freedom group Reporters Without Borders.
In the 2005 presidential election, the government shut down the Internet for hours, blaming it on a cyberattack from abroad, a claim that proved false, according to several Tehran engineers.
Several years ago, research by OpenNet discovered the government using filtering equipment from a U.S. company, Secure Computing Corp. Due to the U.S. trade embargo on Iran, in place since the 1979 Islamic revolution overthrew the U.S.-backed shah, that was illegal. Secure Computing, now owned by McAfee Inc., at the time denied any knowledge of the use of its products in Iran. McAfee said due diligence before the acquisition revealed no contract or support being provided in Iran.
Building online-content inspection on a national scale and coordinated at a single location requires hefty resources, including manpower, processing power and technical expertise, Internet experts said.
Nokia Siemens Networks provided equipment to Iran last year under the internationally recognized concept of "lawful intercept," said Mr. Roome. That relates to intercepting data for the purposes of combating terrorism, child pornography, drug trafficking and other criminal activities carried out online, a capability that most if not all telecom companies have, he said.
The monitoring center that Nokia Siemens Networks sold to Iran was described in a company brochure as allowing "the monitoring and interception of all types of voice and data communication on all networks.." The joint venture exited the business that included the monitoring equipment, what it called "intelligence solutions," at the end of March, by selling it to Perusa Partners Fund 1 LP, a Munich-based investment firm, Mr. Roome said. He said the company determined it was no longer part of its core business.
-- Ben Worthen in San Francisco, Mike Esterl in Atlanta and Siobhan Gorman in Washington contributed to this article.
Write to Christopher Rhoads at christopher.rhoads@wsj.com and Loretta Chao at loretta.chao@wsj.com
Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A1
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Iran Cracks Down on Internet Use, Foreign Media
By Christopher Rhoads, Geoffrey A. Fowler and Chip Cummins
In the days following Iran's election, the government has slowed the speed of the Internet and limited access to Web sites in ways that show the growing technical skills of the country's Web censors.
The government has clamped down on traffic by apportioning less bandwidth to so-called Internet connection providers -- of which there are about 90 in Iran -- that provide Web access to the country's hundreds of Internet service providers.
Iranians have shared online images, video, emails and "tweets" about the protests and spreading violence -- circumventing state-controlled media. But as the public uprising has intensified, so has the government's attempt to control the flow of information. Internet speed is reduced and cellphone service interrupted.
After an increase in Internet use in the days leading up to the election, Internet traffic over broadband connections in Iran dropped 54% in the three days after the vote, compared with a week earlier, based on a sample studied by Limelight Networks Inc., an Internet content delivery company in Tempe, Ariz.
The government also has put stringent limits on reporters' access to demonstrations. The protests have been front-page news across the Middle East, with heavy coverage on al-Jazeera and other Arab satellite news outlets. But the reporting ban affects all foreign reporters -- Western and non-Western alike. Iranian state media released footage and still photos of a rally in support of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but few camera crews appeared to brave the ban to capture footage of supporters of challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi. Al-Jazeera, the Arab news outlet based in Qatar, aired footage of Mousavi demonstrators. But it also said it had been told to respect the media ban..
Iran's approach to controlling the Internet contrasts with that used in Myanmar during the 2007 uprising there. Myanmar, which has a much lower rate of Internet use than Iran, eventually severed access entirely. China takes a more sophisticated tack, allowing high-speed access -- with extensive censorship of Web sites deemed harmful by the government.
The Iranian government appears to be taking a more nuanced -- and technically difficult -- approach: allowing the Internet to operate, albeit at a slower speed, while using a more centralized approach to blocking specific Web sites.
"The government is clearly allowing some content in and some out," said Craig Labovitz, chief scientist of Arbor Networks Inc., an Internet security company in Chelmsford, Mass. "They're not so ham-handed as to just shut everything off."
Throttling bandwidth is almost the same as shutting off the Internet, since it makes accessing Web sites slow enough to discourage users, and makes Internet phoning difficult.
"A lot of people think this is just saving face," said Kaveh Ranjbar, a co-founder of one of Iran's largest Internet service providers and now an engineer with an Internet regulator based in Amsterdam. "The government can say it didn't disconnect the Internet, but the reality is you can't really use it."
The Internet connection providers, or ICPs, on Monday filed a formal complaint to government officials about the reduction in bandwidth, in some cases about 10% of what they had bought, according to Mr. Ranjbar.
One Tehran resident, who asked to be identified only by his first name, Behzad, said his home broadband connection has slowed so much in the past few days that it's almost unusable. Simply loading Google Inc.'s home page, he said, takes up to a minute.
"At the moment, to a large extent, it is stopping communication," Behzad said.
When he called his Internet service provider to inquire about the speed issue, he got a recorded message saying bandwidth restrictions enforced by the government-run Telecommunications Co. of Iran were causing the difficulty, and that engineers were doing their best to resolve the problem.
TCI couldn't immediately be reached for comment.
For years, the Iranian government censored Web sites by requiring Internet service providers to block sites on a constantly updated blacklist provided by the government. Now, it no longer needs service providers' cooperation -- it can block content itself through the Internet arm of its telecom monopoly.. That's not easy, Mr. Ranjbar said, and it requires a lot of bandwidth. "But they're doing it now successfully," he said.
Still, the government is dealing with a mature online population. The Iranian blogosphere, with an estimated 60,000 to 100,000 active blogs, is something of an anomaly in the Middle East. The government estimates about 21 million Iranians are online, about 28% of the population.
"What the government has found over the last few days is that blocking Internet sites is not enough," says Rob Faris, research director at Harvard University's Berkman Center for Internet and Society.
Some Internet users in Iran report having found ways to post to services such as Twitter via proxy servers. California-based Twitter postponed Monday maintenance until Tuesday so it wouldn't disrupt Iranian Twitter users who have managed to bypass blocks. The State Department on Tuesday again asked Twitter to delay the maintenance, scheduled for 1:30 a.m. in Iran, but the company didn't. Twitter said in a blog post Tuesday that the maintenance "took half the time we expected."
Write to Chip Cummins at chip.cummins@wsj.com
Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A9
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